In his responses to Koch (1) and Scheper-Hughes (2) Matas reiterates
his commitment to introducing a well-defined regulated market in human
kidneys, to be introduced “only in situations… where we can provide donor
protection, appropriate oversight, long-term donor follow-up and care, and
an algorithm for allocation to all those on the waiting list” (3).
Matas’ responses to Koch and Scheper-Hughes are well-taken. But given
both the seriousness of the matter at hand and the tendency of (some)
opponents of regulated markets in kidneys to obfuscate the critical issues
it is useful to outline what precisely Koch’s and Scheper-Hughes’
objections are, and then to address them one by one. The need for this is
all the more compelling since even though some of these arguments occur
again and again in the debate over kidney markets, and are rebutted each
time they appear, they, like zombies, simply refuse to die.
Koch offers three objections to Matas’ proposed regulated market in
human kidneys. First, that since there is “no commercial organ system in
place in North America” Matas’ “solution doesn't fix a market problem at
all but instead creats [sic] a market where commercialization has been, in
the past, prohibited.” Second, that Matas’ idea of compensating kidney
providers through life, or long-term, insurance would “only codify
inherent economic inequalities,” for “Only those who can afford these
insurances would be eligible as recipients and the contemporary
inequalities in the system would be exacerbated, not reduced.” Finally,
Koch argues that Matas is incorrect to assert “that arguments against a
market in organs fail ‘on detailed analysis’ and in many cases offer
‘illogical" propositions’,” holding that “The first assertion is at best
debatable and the second simply incorrect. There is, for example, nothing
illogical about Dr. Chapman's response…”. (1)
Scheper-Hughes offers four additional objections to Matas’ proposed
regulated market in human kidneys. First, that the debate over kidney
markets is “unenlightened by the anthropological and ethnographic record
on the individual, social, economic, and political consequences of organ
selling”. Second, that “The arguments by bioethicists and moral
philosophers are based on abstractions that have nothing to do with the
everyday realities of desperate transplant patients or their donors and
sellers.” Third, that “The Iranian model of regulated kidney selling,
which has been suggested as a paradigm for the world to follow, has not
ended the black market there,” for “Living donors are still recruited by
middlemen and private payments (over and above the government stipend) are
negotiated behind the scenes. Thus, claims Scheper-Hughes, “Rather than
replace the black market the government of Iran has legalized it.”
Finally, she notes that at the recent Istanbul summit on organ trafficking
there was near unanimous support “for the ban on commerce in organs and
transplant tourism,” which was viewed by the delegates as “hurting their
country, demeaning their profession, harming the kidney sellers, and under
-serving the real needs of transplant patients for a medically, socially,
and politically ethical system.” (2)
Let us address these seven objections in turn.
It is clear that Koch’s first concern with Matas’ proposal is not an
objection, but simply a restatement of what it is. As such, it can be put
to one side immediately. His second objection—that Matas’ proposal that
kidney providers be compensated through the provision of insurance would
“codify inherent economic inequalities” for only persons who could afford
to pay for the provision of such insurances to kidney providers would be
eligible as kidney recipients—can similarly be dismissed. Koch’s objection
here is implicitly based on the view that under a market model of kidney
procurement the recipients would be compensating the providers directly.
But while this is certainly one way in which a market in kidneys could be
organized it is not the only way. Rather than kidney recipients directly
compensating kidney providers they could be compensated by medical
insurance companies, who would then distribute the kidneys thus procured
to their clients. At the same time kidney providers could be compensated
by government programmes, such as Medicare or Medicaid in the United
States, or the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, who could
then distribute the kidneys thus procured on a medical, rather than a
market, basis. Similarly, charitable organizations could procure kidneys
through the provision of insurance to the providers, and then distribute
them according to their own altruistic principles. Given that all of these
means of distributing kidneys are compatible with their market-based
procurement, Koch is mistaken to claim that markets in human kidneys would
exacerbate current economic inequalities, with only the well-off having
access to them.
Finally, Koch is correct to note that the question of whether markets
in human kidneys are ethically acceptable or not is one that is being
debated—although it should be noted that this is not to say that he is
right to hold that this issue is a “debatable” one, for colloquially this
latter characterization holds pejorative connotations. Having noted this,
however, it should be recognized that none of the arguments in the two
main books that argue in favor of kidney markets—my own Stakes and
Kidneys: Why markets in human body parts are morally imperative (Ashgate,
2005), and Mark J. Cherry’s Kidney For Sale by Owner (Georgetown,
2005)—have been rebutted yet. As such, the onus is firmly upon those
opposed to markets in human kidneys to defend their view that the freedom
of both potential sellers and potential recipients to engage in their life
-saving voluntary economic transactions should continue to be proscribed
by the ban on this market. It should also be noted that Koch’s response to
Matas’ claim that the opponents of markets are often “illogical”—that Dr.
Chapman’s response to him is not—is compatible with Koch’s claim that most
of those opposed to markets in human kidneys offer illogical objections to
them. Ironically enough, then, Koch’s response here to Matas is itself an
illogical one—one cannot show that the claim “Most objections to this
position are illogical” is false by citing only one that is not! Thus,
without additional evidence to the contrary Matas’ claim here stands.
Scheper-Hughes’ responses to Matas fare no better than Koch’s.
Schepher-Hughes first charges that the debate over kidney sales
remains “unenlightened by the anthropological and ethnographic record on
the… consequences of organ selling”. There are two responses to be made
here. The first is that the “anthropological and ethnographic record” that
she refers to pertains to the illegal, unregulated market in kidneys—and
so is simply irrelevant to discussions of legal, regulated markets. The
second is to note that her charge is simply untrue. Both her own work (4-
6) and that of Madhav Goyal (7) is frequently cited within this debate.
Those opposed to kidney markets wrongly hold that it shows what the
consequences of any market in kidneys will be, while those in favour of
them correctly note that the legalization of markets in kidneys will help
prevent the documented abuses by providing a safe legal alternative for
would-be kidney providers.
While Scheper-Hughes’ first objection is thus both irrelevant and untrue,
her second—that “[t]he arguments by bioethicists and moral philosophers
are based on abstractions that have nothing to do with the everyday
realities of desperate transplant patients or their donors and sellers”—is
just untrue. In Stakes and Kidneys, for example, I examine the available
data concerning both illegal markets in kidneys and their legal
counterparts, together with the data pertaining to the risks of
nephrectomy as compared with other dangerous activities to put the risk of
kidney selling into its proper context. To do so, I draw on (among other
sources) both anthropological and ethnographic data (including Scheper-
Hughes’ own), medical data, morbidity and mortality statistics from
Government sources, and published interviews with kidney providers and
recipients. Moreover, Scheper-Hughes is—or should be—aware of the wealth
of evidence concerning “everyday realities” that is marshaled to support
markets in kidneys, for she has reviewed (for The Lancet) the pro-market
books that present it (including mine) (8).
Just as Scheper-Hughes’ second objection is better than her first
(being only untrue, rather than both irrelevant and untrue), so too is her
third, which is not untrue—just irrelevant. Here, Scheper-Hughes holds
that Iran has only legalized a black market, offering as evidence for this
the fact that persons sometimes pay more for a kidney than the Government
sanctioned minimum. This is simply what has happened; what was previously
an illegal market is now legal and regulated, just as the ending of
Prohibition in the United States legalized the former black market in
alcohol. And, just as the repeal of Prohibition ended the abuses
associated with the black market in alcohol, so too has the legalization
of the market in Iran made things better and safer for all concerned.
Scheper-Hughes is also no doubt right that some people pay more than the
Government minimum for kidneys. But it is unclear why this is a moral
problem. After all, most people in the United States are paid more than
the minimum wage, but I assume that Scheper-Hughes does not think that
their employers are acting wrongly in so doing. Scheper-Hughes’
observations of the market in Iran thus do not support her objections to
markets at all.
What, then, of Scheper-Hughes’ final objection—that many of the
delegates to the Istanbul summit are horrified at the effects of
transplant tourism and organ trafficking? Again, this objection is
irrelevant, for it is based on conflating illegal markets with legal,
regulated markets. If one is really interested in eliminating these evils
then one should work to legalize and regulate markets in human kidneys, to
provide both providers and recipients with a safe, legal, environment in
which to engage in their voluntary, life-saving transactions. And this, of
course, is precisely what Matas is arguing that we should do (3).
James Stacey Taylor
Department of Philosophy
The College of New Jersey
Ewing, NJ 08628
USA
(1) Koch T, The logic of organ payments, BMJ online, June 18, 2008.
(2) Scheper-Hughes, A world cut in two, BMJ online, June 21, 2008
(3) Matas AJ, Framing the debate, BMJ online, June 25, 2008
(4) Scheper-Hughes, NM, 2008. “The Illegal Organ Trade: Global
Justice and the Traffic in Human Organs”, chapter 10, Living Donor Organ
Transplantation, R.W.G. Gruessner and E.Bendetti,eds, pp. 106-121.
(5) Scheper-Hughes, NM, 2006. “Is it Ethical for Patients to Purchase
Kidneys from the World’s Poor? A Debate between Tarif Bakdask and Nancy
Scheper-Hughes. PLOS Medicine October 2006 3(10) www.plosmedicine.org
(6) Scheper-Hughes, NM, 2003. “Rotten Trade: Millennial Capitalism,
Human Values, and Global Justice in Organs Trafficking.” Journal of Human
Rights 2 (2): 197-226
(7) Goyal, M. et al., 2002. “Economic and Health Consequences of
Selling a Kidney in India,” JAMA 288: 1589-1593.
(8) Scheper-Hughes, NM, 2005. “Book Review: The Ultimate Commodity.”
The Lancet 366: 1349-1350, October 15.
Competing interests:
None declared